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Abstract 
Diverse groups, Brazilian squatters, Navajc , Eskimos, and others look 
to special forums to resolve disputes outside of the formal legal system. 
These forums are employed because they accept disputes as their clients 
define them and offer remedies based upon these conceptualizations. Formal 
agents of the law in their environments cannot do this. When these forums 
are extralegal (without formal legal authority to act) and are located in an 
environment where the formal legal process has the theoretical capacity to 
intervene in the disputes, they must tap into authentic lines of power to 
maintain their credibility with their constituents. 
Legal power is not usually formally delegated without defined limits 
upon its use. Because extralegal forums often must be free from the con­
straints of particular norms and processes, in order to correctly define and 
remedy disputes, extralegal forums seek borrowed power through special rela­
tionships with formal agents of legal power. Then they reapply it to meet 
the needs of their constituents. 
This paper describes the ways to study these relationships and their 
likely impact upon an informal forum. The author suggests a way of viewing 
extralegal dispute resolution in a given community against the larger matrix 
of relationships between the formal and informal legal process. He draws 
upon his field work in Brazilian squatter colonies, Navajo Indian communities, 
and rural Athabascan and Eskimo villages in Alaska, 
When urban squatters or Native-Americans w:.:th special kinds of disputes 
or with special kinds of remedial needs seek the intervention of third parties 
in their disputes, they will often seek a forum which can understand their 
problem and remedy it authoritatively. In this round of pragmatic forum 
shopping they are not unlike any potential client of any legal system. 
The crux of the client's problem is his selection of the correct forum. 
While he may have physical access to the attorney, policeman, er judge who 
usually provides services in the justice system, his access also contemplates 
a forum that he can manipulate to achieve the particular remedies that he 
desires. Engagement of a powerful third party in any dispute raises the 
threat that the client will lose control of the capacity to define the 
problem and its remedy. Ir. the case of courts and police, it also subjects 
the client and his problem to the unquestioned legal power of the state. 
No forum offers considered remedies for specially conceived problems unless 
it can accept without much effort the problem as defined by the disputants and 
apply its authoritative weight to those issues, Native-Americans, among them 
Navajos, and village Eskimos and Indians in Alaska, �nd urban squatters in 
Brazil share a special talent in this regard because each has created and used 
fourms which are outside the law but that also apply correctly power of the 
legal systems to local disputes. These forums deal with problems and remedies 
in a manner which is qualitatively superior to formally established forums and 
agents of the state or tribal legal system. However, each third party who 
operates in such a forum still needs a pipeline to authentic legal power to 
reinforce his capacity to arbitrate or to conciliate disputes. 
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Each group which I have studied has been denied effective relief by the 
formal legal proc�ss for some of their disputes because the formal legal pro­
cess would not accept either the problems as they were cast by the disputants 
or offer the remedial process that the disputants desired, 
Urban squatters in Brazil have disputes which touch upon ownership, posses­
sion, or use of their homes. These disputes between squatters are theoretically 
adjudicatable within city or state courts. Yet the courts are often driven to 
reject or ignore law suits which consider the property rights of these litigants 
because the object of the dispute is a house built upon land illegally possessed 
ill a favela where "as everyone knows" the law of the jungle prevails. Those 
who know this are people who reside outside of favelas. 
The result of this denial of access to the formal legal process because 
the agents of law deny the authenticity of urban squatter colonies is that 
allocation of rights to property in favelas where half of the urban population 
often resides must take place in forums which are not formally courts at all. 
Confronted with this threat to their property rights in homes which are 
regularly bought, sold, and rented, squatter communities establish their own 
forums to deal with real property disputes as they surface in neighborhood 
disputes or as secondary considerations in family squabbles. These forums 
both understand and reiterate accepted definitions of property in the favela. 
They also have access to external legal power to make decisions stick. Their 
"judges" are used by the police to ferret out criminal law violators in neigh­
borhoods where police usually fear to tread. 
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As dispute rc�olvers these forums attempt to conciliate disputes. Howeve�, 
where consensual agreements cannot stick they employ the threat of police power 
which they can bring to bear upon a recalcitrant disputant by recasting the 
problem as a matter for the police and reporting it under one of the catch-all 
definitions of antisocial misdemeanors which are present in every criminal code. 
This extension of power out of the criminal justice system and reapplica­
tion to civil disputes is a technique �ployed by Athabascan village chiefs, 
Eskimo village councils, and Navajo judges and chapter house officers (Conn, 1971; 
Vicenti, 1972; Conn and Hippler, 1972, 1973). 
To define the formula for successful resolution of disputes in an extralegal 
forum in its entirety, local forums for dispute resolution, in my experience, 
succeed when: 
1. They have access to or can direct real power. The local resolver
of disputes can reinforce his position by employing as leverage other,
more powerful authorities who do not unilaterally intervene on a
regular basis.
2. They define problems and remedies in ways that are acceptable to
participants and to potential participants. They address mutual
interests with some insight into the basis for definition of these
respective interests. The third party who resolves disputes knows the
limits of his authority where adjudication ends and a process of
conciliation begins,
That is, the dispute resolver makes appropriate use of law and nonlaw (e.g.,
commercial understandings and custom) and can relate his actions,
judgments, or persuasive endeavors to the particular outlook of the
people with a dispute.
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Innnediate acctss and employment of legal power is also limited to Navajos 
who seek relief in tribal or state courts or to Eskimo people who seek help 
from state magistrates, the lay judges who function now in their 
villages. One reason for this is that the sets of rights and duties which 
flow from their living arrangements are not satisfactorily reaffirmed in 
court hearings unless the lay judge, who is usually himself a Native-American, 
is sufficiently comfortable with the rigidities of his role to move from them 
and proceed imaginatively. 
For example, for Navajos, rights to use and enjoyment of land held by 
g�azing permits and the personal property of deceased persons are best sorted 
out prior to any court hearing in Navajo tribal court. Although the Navajo 
code stipulates that custom is to be deemed superior to state common law and 
statute in this and other matters, training sessions prior to 1968 that many 
older judges attended included warnings that unless criminal and civil pro­
cess and decisions therefrom emulated state law, the states might take over 
the Navajo legal system. While this threat was removed in Congress by the Indian 
Civil Rights Act which made tribal consent a prerequisite for such a takeover, 
this diminution of custom to an evidentiary matter left to be proved affirm­
atively by the litigant effectively limited an opportunity to develop a com-
mon law of custom for even this rather large and contiguous group. 
It is no surprise that within the vaccuum so created, local community leaders, 
chapter house officers whose political authority is real enough, as well as 
officers of the court, Navajo lay advocates, were lead to conciliate disputes 
which could not proceed to court unless the rights and duties of parties were 
substantially redefined in the process. 
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Each had the advantage of not being the judge and yet possessing a role 
which allowed them to summon up legal power if their role as extralegal dispute 
resolver was challenged. They also were capable of recharacterizing the dis­
pute and bringing judicial and police power down upon the challenger. 
For the Eskimos as well as the Navajo, a concept of comparative negligence 
prevailed in disputes which result in their physical and property damage. No 
distinction existed between criminal or civil disputes. Remedies awarded 
extrajudicially in village councils were thus victim-oriented and usually 
involved acts which ranged from an apology to restitution. (It should be 
noted that a process which looks at relative fault in the context of the 
dispute is also more likely to succeed in conciliation of disputes. ) 
Civil legal process which seeks liability on one side only and the guilt 
seeking of criminal process which awards the governmental entity with a fine and 
not the victim are potentially amenable to cuange. However, the problem is that 
the courts afforded Native-Americans in these two cases, the magistrate court 
and the tribal court, are deficient in flexibility even when formal power is 
delegated to Native-Americans to judge their own. The thrust for modernization 
and uniformity in judicial training sessions and in supervision by consulting 
attorneys or judicial advisors colors the process with undue rigidity. The hand­
hold on power -- if translated into the handhold on the job, as it often is 
places undue pressure upon judges to give fellow Native-Americans hyperlegal 
and hypertechnical examples of the working legal process. If someone is to adapt, 
it is assumed that it will be the consumer of justice and not the supplier. 
--
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From the inception of white contact Eskim0 communities.were afforded 
an opportunity to deal effectively with internal disputes without tying 
them to the rigidities of Anglo-American legal process. This circumstance 
was created first because even those military and governmental agencies 
who enforced law did so thenselves extralegally. A jurisdictional base 
for law enforcement over the civilian population was not afforded to these 
authorities for the first twenty years of territorial status. The second 
reason was logistical. The lay judge, the white commissioner, had no 
marshal!. The marshal! had no connnissioner. Neither had funds to trans­
port offenders or witnesses in any but the more serious cases. Many of 
the logistical constraints upon what purpoJts to be a unified justice system 
in Alaska continue to the present day. 
Left with this situation, agents of American and state power, territorial 
and later state police and prosecutors reinforced the power of villages to 
make and enforce law extralegally. The Alaska Native Service aided many 
villages in organization under the Indian Reorganization Act under the theory 
that members of these corporations could make and enforce rules upon them­
selves. A territortal village incorporation act which later became state law 
allowed village councils who had no judges to make misdemeanors and enforce 
them in proceedings "substantially similar" to those of the magistrate. This 
narrow legal base, supplemented by calls to police, allowed Eskimos and some 
Athabascan councils to deal authoritatively with a range of disputes. Troopers 
were given phenomenally large areas to enforce the law. The single trooper 
in Bethel, for example, dealt with a region of tundra, rivers, and seacoast 
that included 57 Eskimo villages in over 90,000 square miles of territory. When 
he received complaints from the councils, he encouraged, by written replies and by 
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visits, disposition by the council in lieu of arrests. In �963 the district 
attorney from Fairbanks helped these same villages draw up a set of village 
rules to enforce. If problems arose, each rule was capable of reinforcement. 
by filing a general complaint with the state court system. 
This collaboration by village councils with agents of the military and 
later civil law enforcement might have lead them to be no more than mandarin 
agents of the police. In fact, a review of council records indicates a dif­
ferent direction for legal process when it was placed into council hands. 
Many village councils manipulated their role as agents of the police by 
conciliating disputes and sending only the recidivist, the person who was 
wanted out of the village, away for certain conviction in the real system. 
Of course the capacity of councils to act as full-blown forums was 
subject to several external concerns. If the police were capable of getting 
into the village too often, the council's role diminished and became more 
policelike. Fines or short jail sentences then became the rule and not the 
exception. The capacity of police to reinforce councils diminished as police 
became more accountable to district attorneys and more rigidly the invastigators 
and not decision-makers in the prosecution of crimes. Some observers may con­
clude that the increase in alcoholic traffic to villages by carriers who were 
indifferent to the pleas of councils to limit this traffic also gave rise 
to more violent crimes which councils were less capable of controlling through 
calm deliberation. Yet I would interpret the emergence of violent crimes in 
part as a consequence of councils' loss of capacity to intervene in disputes 
at an earlier time on a lower level, as they did during most of the twentieth 
century. 
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No single act destroyed the council's capacity to divert and reapply 
legal power in its proceedings than the introduction of a lay magistrate 
in their village theoretically to take up the process of justice. The 
magistrates were less capable of offering private results to disputes 
filed as criminal complaints. The adversary system which is the main­
stay of the judicial process in combination with plea bargaining between 
disputants' attorneys has never worked because there are no advocates in 
the village to make it work. Although the magistrate system did not 
take up the gamut of complaints heard in the council, it supplanted the 
council as a rubberstamp for law enforcement. 
One can argue that the diminution of the council as a forum for dispute 
resolution was inevitable. Each council now is innundated with governmental 
considerations and reorganization efforts in order for it to take control over 
the surface rights to ten townships around the village under the Alaska Native 
Land Claims legislation. Perhaps, one should wait to see what extrajudicial 
figure might bleed off sufficient legal power to resolve disputes informally. 
There is some sign that village constables, much as their brothers in smaller 
cities and towns, employ the threat of arrest (and invariable conviction) as 
an inducement to resolve disputes. 
Extralegal Forums -- Their Future 
While it appears that particular extralegal forums will rise and fall 
according to their capacity to tap into authentic power and meet the other 
requisites of a forum outside but adjacent to formal legal process, it also 
appears that unless the formal legal process adapts itself to special problems, 
new forums will emerge. 
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In squatter colonies in five Brazilian citles and in squatter colonies 
in a single city, one can discover entirely different extralegal forums each 
which resolve property disputes and each with its own considered ties to 
police power, local courts, or the state. In Pirambu in Fortaleza, Brazil, 
the forum is known as the "little court" and functions with explicit recog­
nition by municipal land offices, the church, and the courts, In Dende, in 
Rio de Janeiro, the residents' association, under fire in civil litigation 
which threatens the favela's control of land itself, retains crucial ties with 
the local police precinct. 
In transitional Native-American communities where the relationship between 
active agents of outside power and traditional power continues to change, one 
can perceive two developments. First, traditional dispute resolvers (such as 
the Athabascan chief) tap into the legal process by acting as the village's 
agent for communication with the police or they are replaced by other modern 
entities such as the council or roles such as the village constable. On the 
Navajo reservation the traditional headman has been similarly replaced by 
the chapter officer, the lay advocate, or the grazing committee member. 
However, while power relationships tend to determine who or what may resolve 
a dispute, the fundamental ways in which disputes are resolved -- their defini­
tion, the process, the remedies afforded -- differ very little as dispute re­
solvers change. 
For a student of dispute resolution to discover the crucial dynamics of 
the extralegal forum which operates in an environment where formal legal pro­
cess and its agents also hold sway, I suggest study of the process on three 
levels. 
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First, the student must know the formal legal structure and process which 
operates beyond the community and which purports �o affect legal relationships 
inside the community, Second, the student must understand the actual dynamics 
of the process -- what Brazilians might term the jeito of the legal process, the 
way it is. The influence of plea bargaining and the actual availability of at­
torneys or paralegals to persons inside or outside of the community are examples 
of this, Third, the student must know the particular adaptations of legal process 
for the community studied and consequent responses by and compensations for re­
sultant deficiencies in the process by the corrmunity in its own complementary law 
ways. Here for example, patterns of nonenforcement of fish and game laws by state 
troopers upon Natives or their reinforcement of village councils as local courts 
and the operation of local councils fall into place. 
Thus, when one scudies cases which appe2r before the council, one is 
aware of the particular and changing influence or lack of influence of formal 
legal process as theory and as reality and particularly, the councils' responses 
to shifts in the employment of power by outside police, attorneys and judges. 
Some of these changes in the employment of power as they affect village Alaska 
have been described above. Internal law of a village is in a crucial sense 
not internal at all since it looks outward to those who can wield real legal 
power and attempt to do so within the group studied. 
If one employs this three-tiered picture of the world, for studying law 
and nonlaw as dynamics of society, one discovers certain things. First, 
one recognizes the role of legal fiction or legal ideology even when that 
role is not intrinsically important to each case that one observes. The 
cloak of authenticity, even if it is no more than the black robe handed to 
a single member of the village who without much training is denominated and 
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�aid as judge, reverberates through the village legal system and challenges 
the authenticity of the council as forum for dispute resolution, even when 
the council is more successful at dispute resolution, The dynamics of the 
legal process are also important. The troopers get an airplace and must 
justify their regular flights into the village with arrests instead of lectures 
before the council. A prosecutor is delegated to a large Eskimo town such as 
Bethel, and removes from the troopers the decision of whether or not to prosecute, 
asking them to bring back the offender so that he, and not they, make this 
decision. The tribal judge returns from a training session where he has been 
warned not to shake hands with litigants he knows despite the fact that he is 
a member of their clan. He has been taught judicial independence. This also 
reverberates through his clients' community as a legal environment. 
What one observes from many of these examples is this: that power derived 
from the form�l legal system is more flexible than power delegated along with 
the substance of law. The latter delegation of power comes with particular 
strings attached. Tho3e strings more often than not reflect just the ideology 
and not the reality of legal process. The formal agent of law in the village 
is often urged to unlearn his sense of a complete system of dispute resolution 
as a range of formal and informal remedies. And when he does this, he becomes 
little more than a pale reflection of som� other court or some other formal 
agent foreign to the local connnunity. He loses his constituency because his 
constituency depended upon·him to "make a balance" not only between litigants 
but between the power of law and the sense of local norms as they defined 
appropriate ways to solve conflict in his village. When this careful balancing 
act is not accomplished, a forum is dead for the effective resolution of 
important local disputes however much power is delegated to it. 
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Of course what I am explaining is no more or less than the reason why 
the legal system has lost its vitality in this country. Too ingrown, too 
self-centered and concerned with the formation of guild-like traps, and 
smothered by its own mystique, it has lost potential clients. The earliest 
clients to go were big businesses who have made arbitration a second system 
of justice. Unfortunately, untold number of consumers of justice, both 
middleclass and poor, have been less capable of pulling out of the legal 
process and recreating forums which are more socially conscionable. 
Rabbinical courts are built on shared law and shared identity. Vigilante 
activists were organized if we are to credit near-recent interpretations as 
the forerunners or heralds of a legal system which had not reached its frontier. 
The examples of extralegality that I have studied are somewhat different. 
The Eskimo council and the favela forum are at once employed as courts by those 
who aspire to a system of law which they expect will offer some regularity to 
their problems and be employed as a buffer to the aspects of law which are less 
welcome because they represent other outside interests. 
In terms of the allocation of power there is the seed of Aristotelian 
tragedy in every forurr. such as this. Their linkage to real power is tenuous and 
fragile. Forces at work on their society are changing it constantly, -The 
legal ideology of the larger society is a participant in this change. However, 
I suggest that an exploration of these relationships and more importantly the 
changes effected in the legal process by such disparate groups as urban 
squatters or Eskimos can tell us more than any essay on the consumer's perspec­
tive, what the reality of a consumer perspective might mean if alternative but 
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authenticated processes were available for people in a legal 3ystem that was 
not self-defined but defined by consumers and by those persons who actually want 
to solve the disputes. 
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